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Does Tax Matter? Evidence on Executive





As part of the most sweeping federal tax reform in a generation, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
("TCJA") radically altered the tax treatment of compensation paid to senior executives of public
companies. Prior to the TCJA, payment of such compensation in excess of one million dollars
was non-deductible except to the extent the compensation was performance-based. The TCJA
eliminated the exception so that all senior executive compensation above one million dollars is
now non-deductible regardless of whether it is performance-based or not.
This reform provides a natural experiment to study the role of tax law in influencing managerial
pay decisions, an issue that has been debated for decades by scholars and policymakers. Did the
elimination of the performance-based pay exception influence senior executive compensation
decisions?
Using a novel empirical design, we find no evidence that the repeal of the performance-based
pay exception changed the most significant and salient compensation features, namely the pro-
portion of performance-based pay to total pay and the overall amount of pay. On the other hand,
when we move from headline compensation features to smaller, technical ones, our data sug-
gests that the tax change has had a significant influence. This suggests that tax rules may be
consequential in shaping executive compensation practices only when no one (other than tax
advisors) is paying attention.
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, John F. Scarpa Center for Law and Entrepreneur-
ship, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law.
Francis Shackelford Distinguished Professor in Taxation Law, University of Georgia
School of Law.
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Does Tax Matter?
Introduction
In December 2017, Netflix announced that it would radically change the way it
compensated its top executives. Chief Content Officer Ted Sarandos, for example, saw
his salary increase from $1 million to $12 million.' That additional $11 million in salary
replaced what had been a similar cash bonus opportunity under a "Performance Bonus
Plan" tracking Netflix's performance.2 In its public filing, Netflix explained the shift
from bonuses to salaries as a response to tax law changes under the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act ("TCJA") enacted earlier that month.3 In a move that had come as a surprise to
most, the TCJA had removed the tax advantage for paying senior executives compen-
sation that was "performance-based."4 Netflix claimed to be responding to this tax law
change by making its pay less performance-based, suggesting that its prior choices
regarding pay design were heavily influenced by tax considerations.
In this Article, we examine whether Netflix is an outlier in its responsiveness to
tax law or whether it is merely the tip of the iceberg. Using a novel empirical approach
to assessing firms' responses to the TCJA, we find evidence suggesting that firms have
not changed the broad strokes of compensation design. At the margins, however, ra-
ther than making the headlines (a la Netflix), firms and CEOs appear to have taken
subtle, technical steps to adjust compensation patterns in response to the tax change.
Taken together, these results imply that tax does not affect the core deal between man-
agers and boards -how much the executive is paid, what are her incentives -but that
firms will grab tax advantages that do not implicate these central concerns.
We thus contribute to a long-running debate about the causes of and potential
fixes for American inequality. Though there are now high-profile debates about how
much more unequal U.S. wealth has become, everyone agrees that America's wealthi-
est claim a larger share of national wealth than ever before. A substantial fraction
(more than 40%, by one estimate) of this group are top executives of large public com-
panies, such as Mr. Sarandos.5 Pay for these executives has skyrocketed over the last
1. Netflix, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 26, 2017), https:/ /perma.cc/E2SL-Y3QU; see also
Michael Hiltzik, Netflix raises executive salaries, proving that 'performance-based' pay always
was a sham, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://perma.cc/NKS6-RAGK. Other
than Sarandos, Netflix also raised the salaries of CFO David Wells ($2 to $2.8 million) and
Chief Product Officer Greg Peters ($1 to $6 million). See id. CEO Reed Hastings's salary
was not increased.
2. See Netflix, Form 8-K, supra note 1, at 1 n.1.
3. Id. ("Salary for each Named Executive Officer ... that was over $1 million had a substan-
tial surcharge to the Company under IRS rule 162(m). Thus, the Company created, and
the shareholders approved, the Performance Bonus Plan (the 'Plan') for those whose sal-
ary the Company wanted to cap at $1 million to avoid the surcharges. With the recent
passage of federal tax reform, the Plan will no longer eliminate such surcharge. As such,
the Committee has determined that all cash compensation for 2018 will be paid as sal-
ary.").
4. See infra Part II.
5. Jon Bakija, Adam Cole & Bradley T. Heim, Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and
the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data 34 (Apr.
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (https://perma.cc/E2YT-MTDP). In July 2020, Sarandos
was named co-CEO of Netflix, see Press Release, Netflix, Ted Sarandos Appointed Co-
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30 years. For instance, in 1989 the average CEO earned fifty-eight times as much as her
average employee; today, that figure is about two hundred and seventy-eight to one.6
Some commentators tie this dramatic growth to self-serving exercises of "mana-
gerial power."7 In this view, over time executives have become more skilled at shaping
and influencing the shareholder-elected boards of directors that set the executives'
pay. With the help of compensation consultants, executives negotiate compensation
packages of such complexity and opacity that few observers can even know how much
the executive is paid, let alone whether she earned it.
Others argue that complex and staggeringly large pay is not a failure of board and
shareholder oversight, but instead a vindication of it.8 Managers are increasingly con-
sequential and have more general, transferrable expertise as opposed to the firm-spe-
cific kind.9 Moreover, they have to be encouraged to take on the kinds of risk that their
diversified shareholders prefer, while balancing these against the preferences of firm
creditors and other business partners. Striking that balance requires complex pay in-
struments that leave managers poorer when their firm fails. And managers, like other
humans, dislike risk, so pay that forces them to bear this risk must include a premium
to offset it.10
Failures of tax policy have offered a third popular explanation, possibly to the
exclusion of the others. Congress has often used tax incentives to promote certain com-
pensation arrangements and penalize others." While it is good academic sport to crit-
icize federal intervention in executive pay generally,1 2 intervention-via-tax has come
in for particularly withering attacks.13 For instance, efforts to use the tax system to con-
trol compensation have been so riddled with loopholes that they have been largely
CEO of Netflix (uly 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/3TF9-VXGR, a move that will presum-
ably raise his pay to even greater heights.
6. LAWRENCE MISHEL & JULIA WOLFE, ECON. POuCY INSTITUTE, CEO COMPENSATION HAS
GROWN 940% SINCE 1978; TYPICAL WORKER COMPENSATION HAS GROWN ONLY 12% DURING
THAT TIME 8,14,16 (2019), https://perma.cc/2DH9-5T84.
7. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 61-79 (2004).
8. Kevin J. Murphy & Jan Zabojnik, Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs 30-31 (Apr.
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (https://perma.cc/9QDA-VP52).
9. Id. at 4.
10. Unlike shareholders, managers are unable to diversify to protect against heir company's
firm-specific risk because they necessarily have an extremely large human capital invest-
ment in the company and because of contractual restrictions against hedging their finan-
cial investment in the company.
11. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2006) (performance-based exception to cap on deductions
for compensation); I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(c)(ii) (2006) (limitation on deductibility for change-
in-control payments); I.R.C. § 4999 (1984) (excise tax on executive's receipt of certain
change-in-control payments); I.R.C. § 409A (2010) (tax penalties for certain distributions
of deferred compensation).
12. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 72-73.
13. See Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WAsH. &
LEE L. REV. 877, 884 (2007); see generally Andrew C.W. Lund, Tax's Triviality as a Pay-Re-
forming Device, 57 VILL. L. REV. 571 (2012); Michael Doran, Uncapping Executive Pay, 90 S.
CAL. L. REV. 815 (2017).
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ineffective.14
But the criticism of the now-repealed preference for performance-based compen-
sation had gone much further.15 Leading executive compensation experts on both sides
of the debate have argued that it may well have been the now-repealed preference for
performance-based pay, rather than managerial power or efficient contracting, that
drove compensation growth over the past twenty-five years.16 This provision, section
162(m), was first adopted in 1993. Until 2018, it denied businesses a deduction for an-
nual compensation paid to top executives in excess of one million dollars per execu-
tive, unless that pay was performance-based. Once the one-million-dollar threshold
was reached, companies were therefore encouraged to pay compensation in the form
of performance shares, stock options, and bonuses. These forms of compensation were
in turn associated with higher overall compensation levels than pure salary. Option
grants, for example, took a sharp turn upwards after 162(m)'s adoption, naturally rais-
ing the question of whether 162(m) was the culprit.
Although there has been a lot of debate, and a fair bit of evidence,17 any claim of
162(m)'s effects has been largely speculative. The rise in executive pay was certainly
associated with the passage of 162(m), but the problem is separating causation from
correlation. Maybe 162(m) just happened to arrive at the beginning of a booming trend
in executive compensation? This trend may have been driven by the rise of more pow-
erful institutional shareholders who demanded more performance-based compensa-
tion so as to align executives' interests with their own.18 Alternatively, performance-
based pay may have exploded because its complex nature uniquely enabled executives
14. See Doran, supra note 13, at 821-35.
15. Additionally, managerial power theorists sometimes point to particularly complicated
pay structures with no obvious efficiency rationale as evidence that managers are delib-
erately making their pay hard for others to understand. But if taxes can explain some of
these complex wrinkles, that would undermine some of the evidence of managerial
power.
16. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are and How We Got There, in
2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 288 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Murphy, Where We Are] ("Ironically, although the objective of the
new IRS Section 162(m) was to reduce excessive CEO pay levels by limiting
deductibility, the ultimate result . .. was a significant increase in CEO pay."); Kevin J.
Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 35 (John S. Beasley ed., 2011) [hereinafter Murphy, Politics]
("The legislative history supports a third, non-mutually exclusive [to managerial
power and efficient contracting] hypothesis: the explosion in stock options that led
to the escalation in pay was in large part the (arguably unintended) consequence
of government policy [including 162(m)]."); Kevin J. Murphy & Michael Jensen, The Pol-
itics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences ofRegulating Executive Compensation, 3 J.L. FIN. &
ACCT. 189, 195 (2018) ("While not the only factor driving the level and composition of
CEO pay, Section 162(m) has been a leading cause of the evolution of pay since the
early 1990s."); Rick Wartzman, This Little-Noticed Section Of Trump's Tax Plan Could Make
Corporate America More Responsible, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/7YA3-9U7Y ("'It was 162(m) that ... led to an explosion in executive
pay,' [late Professor Lynn] Stout says.").
17. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Murphy, Where We Are, supra note 16, at 74.
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to obtain unjustifiably high compensation.19
And then, all at once and with no apparent warning, the 162(m) performance-
based exception was suddenly gone at the end of 2017. Although the tax preference's
elimination does not allow us to determine with certainty what effect 162(m) had on
executive pay in 1993, it does provide insight into 162(m)'s-and tax law's-conse-
quentiality almost 25 years later. If 162(m)'s preference for performance-based com-
pensation was pushing firms to use that sort of pay, then we would expect its repeal
to cause firms to drift back to using lower amounts of performance-based compensa-
tion, as Netflix did. Correspondingly, if high levels of performance pay required firms
to pay their executives more because of the associated risk premium, we would expect
to see lower amounts of compensation overall as the risk premium diminished. On the
other hand, if 162(m)'s preference was less influential, we would expect to see little or
no change in the kinds, and overall amount, of compensation paid to executives after
it was eliminated.2 0
While the empirical analysis of this issue might appear straightforward, several
details make it challenging.2 1 The law changed less than three years ago so our data is
limited. Relatedly, executive compensation is liable to be sticky - subject to formal and
informal agreements and understandings that may be difficult for firms to revise im-
mediately. For example, a CEO hired before the tax law change in 2017 may have a
five-year employment contract establishing salary, bonus, and equity compensation
levels, and mutually amending this contract midstream may prove unattractive. As a
result, analysis of the effects of the new tax law in the 2018-2020 period may systemat-
ically undervalue the effects of the tax change over the longer term. To overcome this
problem, we offer a novel empirical approach that focuses precisely on the sort of com-
pensation arrangements least susceptible to stickiness-new CEO employment con-
tracts. We compare new CEO contracts entered into during the period prior to the
TCJA and those entered into during the two-year period following it.
Using this approach we find no evidence that new CEO hires in the post-TCJA
period were paid with a different proportion of performance-based and non-perfor-
mance-based pay as compared to their colleagues hired prior to the TCJA. Likewise,
we see no significant evidence that the total amount of CEO compensation has
changed after the TCJA.
These findings undermine the argument that 162(m) was driving compensation
growth or structure. Of course, we cannot say for sure what may have been happening
19. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 53-60; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David
I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69
U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 789 (2002).
20. See Subpart III.E. below for a specific instance of small-bore compensation choices of this
sort.
21. Two groups in accounting and finance have done work on the matter to this point. See
LeAnn Luna, Kathleen Schuchard, & Danielle Stanley, Changes in CEO Compensation
After the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act and the Impact of Corporate Governance: Initial Evidence
(June 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (https://perma.cc/R99F-NMWL); Lisa De
Simone, Charles McClure, & Bridget Stomberg, Examining the Immediate Effects of Recent
Tax Law Changes on the Structure of Executive Compensation (Kelley Sch. of Bus. Rsch. Paper,
Paper No. 19-28, 2020), https://perma.cc/F656-8BDK.
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in 1993. However, our data certainly do cast doubt on 162(m)'s role in recent compen-
sation patterns, and we are unaware of any reason to believe the significance of tax
considerations in this context has changed much between then and now. More
broadly, our results suggest that the tax code is not the best vehicle for influencing
firms' core compensation practices.
Our story is a bit more nuanced, though, when we focus in on one particular detail
of compensation design. Before the TCJA, compensation earned by an executive in one
year but not actually paid to her until retirement was always deductible by the com-
pany in the later year. Thus, for executives earning more than $1 million of salary,
deferring portions of the salary until after retirement was an end-run around the
162(m) cap. Congress tried to close this loophole in the TCJA by applying the deduct-
ibility cap even to departed executives.
We find that firms indeed exploited the deferred compensation loophole, and that
TCJA didn't fully succeed in closing it. Specifically, we find that before the TCJA, use
of deferred compensation is strongly correlated with executives who likely earn more
than $1 million in salary, as one would expect. After TCJA, that correlation vanishes,
but another appears in a different context. In sum, our evidence implies that 162(m)
did have some effect on certain technical details of executive compensation practices.
These details, however, did not affect total pay, and had little impact on the CEO's
risk, incentives, or other key aspects of the deal. So we think on the whole these results
are consistent with the intuition that, in the executive compensation context, taxes play
a relatively insignificant role in major design issues, even though they are taken into
account at the technical level when other influences on pay design are less significant.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the history and mechanics
of 162(m) from its enactment in 1993 until its major reform in the TCJA. The passage
of 162(m) came in response to an explosion in executive pay levels, an explosion which
continued and even accelerated following adoption. We summarize the extensive
work documenting this rise as well as the resulting debate among academics and prac-
titioners over what at least some considered to be a failure in the managerial labor
market at public companies.
Part II describes the TCJA reforms to 162(m). It also discusses the contemporane-
ous work on the effects of the reforms by two teams of researchers, who reach tentative
but differing conclusions on the matter.
Part III empirically analyzes post-TCJA executive compensation design in an ef-
fort to determine the impact, if any, of the 162(m) reforms. We use the novel approach
described above and find that the changes to 162(m) were not important to big ticket
compensation practices. However, we find a substantial small-bore effect on deferred
compensation arrangements, suggesting firms were responsive to the 162(m) changes
with respect to the technical structuring of pay.
I. The Rise of 162(m) and Its Place in the Executive Compensation Debates
A. 162(m)'s Adoption and Mechanics
Executive pay became a political issue in the early 1990s after rising for the prior
Winter 2021 7
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decade.22 Then-Presidential candidate Bill Clinton's attacks on pay practices combined
revulsion at the overall level of pay23 as well as pay's insensitivity to company perfor-
mance.24 In the middle of the 1992 presidential campaign, he proposed to eliminate tax
deductions for all pay to an employee that exceeded a $1 million annual cap.25 After
his election, his team modified that position in its bid for what would become the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Under new section 162(m), instead of a blan-
ket disallowance of deductions for pay in excess of $1 million, firms could deduct such
excess pay only if it was performance-based.26
The performance-based pay exception corresponded to a significant finance liter-
ature from the 1980s and early 1990s arguing that contingent pay should be used to
align incentives and mitigate agency costs.27 Famously, Michael Jensen and Kevin
Murphy argued that paying CEOs like bureaucrats -mostly through performance-in-
sensitive salary and perquisites -caused them to behave like bureaucrats and run
companies in risk-averse and effort-averse ways.28 Increasing performance sensitivity
in CEO pay would lead to better outcomes for shareholders, the theory predicted. In
fact, by the enactment of section 162(m) in 1993, the shift towards greater performance-
based pay was already well underway, as institutional shareholders had been pressing
firms to adopt what were viewed to be more shareholder-friendly pay practices.
Section 162(m) ratified this view. It capped the compensation deduction available
to public firms for amounts paid to each of the "top five" executives - the CEO and the
remaining four highest-paid officers--in excess of $1 million annually.29 Effectively
22. See, e.g., Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press?
Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REV. 28, May-June 1992, at 28 (noting that not since
the 1930s had compensation earned the attention of as many public officials as it did in
the early 1990s); Louis M. Thompson, Jr., The SEC Targets Executive Pay, 15 DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Summer 1991, at 48 (editorializing that it "did not take a whiz kid" to realize that
Congress would get involved with such an "emotionally charged issue" as excessive com-
pensation in a time of recession); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Com-
pensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 740 (1995) ("Section 162(m) ... was a response to the populist
desire to penalize highly paid executives.").
23. See Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensations, upra note 22, at 738.
24. See id.
25. See Sarah Anderson, The Failure of Bill Clinton's CEO Pay Reform, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2016,
7:35 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/QK3A-BJV7.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138. For more on the history of the pay-
for-performance movement, see Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing
Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677
(2011).
28. See Jensen & Murphy, CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, supra note
27, at 138.
29. Top five executives included the CEO and the four next most highly-compensated offic-
ers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(c)(2) (2012). The definition of "officer" was determined in
accordance with the rules for executive compensation disclosure under Regulation S-K.
Id. In 2007, in response to changes in disclosure rules, the IRS changed the definition by
excluding CFOs from the group, thus, limiting the term to cover the CEO and four high-
est-paid, non-CFO officers. I.R.S. Notice 2007-49, 2007-1 C.B. 1429.
Vol 26:18
Does Tax Matter?
this imposed a 35 percent surcharge, relative to the prior tax regime, to tax-paying
firms on amounts paid to executives over $1 million. However, firms could still claim
deductions for compensation above $1 million to the extent it constituted "qualified
performance-based compensation."30 Qualified performance-based compensation was
defined as compensation that was (i) based on objective performance goals, (ii) ap-
proved by an independent compensation committee of the board, and (iii) approved
by shareholders.31
Public companies facing corporate tax liability and with executives earning above
$1 million thus had a tax incentive to shift some pay to contingent forms. In the light
of the prevailing executive compensation practices at the time of enactment, this would
mean a shift to performance cash bonuses or stock options. The latter, if (as was typi-
cal) granted at-the-money, were considered performance-based because their value in-
creased or decreased based on firm performance as measured by stock price.32 Time-
vested restricted stock, on the other hand, was not considered performance-based be-
cause the executive would receive a benefit so long as she remained employed for the
requisite length of time and the stock did not become worthless. 162(m) privileged
stock options even further because option plans could be "qualified," i.e., approved by
shareholders, without the approved plans specifying anything other than the broadest
possible limitations - the total number of shares available under the plan and maxi-
mum numbers of shares for particular employees. The actual number of options to be
granted to an executive could be left to the board's subsequent discretion, preserving
maximum flexibility. Performance bonuses, on the other hand, were required to be
based on pre-established, objective performance goals, whose satisfaction was re-
quired to be certified by independent directors.33 Subjective or qualitative performance
goals could not be used to qualify the pay for deductibility. While boards could retain
subjective discretion to depart downwards from formulaic bonus awards, they could
not retain discretion to make upwards adjustments without sacrificing deductions.
B. Compensation Post-162(m) and the Great Debate
Executive pay did not decline following 162(m)'s adoption.34 In fact, it continued
its upward trajectory, roughly tripling over the next eight years-from a median of
$2.9 million per year among S&P 500 CEOs in 1993 to $9.3 million (in constant, infla-
tion-adjusted terms) among the same group in 2001- before slowing during the first
30. I.R.C. §162(m)(4)(C) (2006).
31. Id.
32. See Polsky, supra note 13, at 677.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Murphy, Politics, supra note 16 ("The emerging conclusion is that attempts to
regulate CEO pay [including tax interventions] have been mostly unblemished by suc-
cess."); Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation
Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 519-26 (2009); Polsky, supra note 13,
at 884 n.36; Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences ofTrying
to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1674-75
(2004).
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decade of this century.35 Among a slighter smaller group of firms, average compensa-
tion now is estimated at about $17 million, with an annual growth rate around 5%.36
That increase in the 1990s largely corresponded with rising grants of performance-
based compensation. During the initial post-adoption period (through 2010), stock op-
tions made up for the lion's share of this contingent pay, while time-vested restricted
stock and performance shares -restricted stock that vests upon meeting performance
goals-reached parity and eventually surpassed stock options during the post-2010
period.37
As it became apparent hat 162(m) had not constrained pay as intended, the pro-
vision came in for substantial criticism. Some contended that an effective 35% sur-
charge on "bad" compensation may not have been strong enough medicine to reshape
pay practices.38 In addition, the performance-based pay exception was riddled with
loopholes and workarounds. For example, qualification of bonus pay or performance
shares as "performance-based" merely required targets to be set out in advance; there-
fore, a company could use unambitious targets to deduct amounts that were, in sub-
stance, salary.39 Likewise, at-the-money options granted in a rising stock market of-
fered highly likely compensation regardless of performance.4
Separate and apart from the performance-based pay exception, 162(m) permitted
deductibility of all pay to people who were no longer covered executive officers. Firms
could thus gain back deductibility for pay over $1 million if they used deferred com-
pensation arrangements to delay payment until after the executive retired. Potentially,
then, 162(m) might explain some of the prevalence of very large executive retirement
payouts. Managerial power scholars had suggested that there was little efficiency-
based justification for these plans, and that they were used mostly because they were
hard for shareholders to track, but other commentators have managed to posit poten-
tial pro-shareholder explanations.41
35. See Murphy, Where We Are, supra note 16, at 227.
36. MISHEL & WOLFE, supra note 6, at 7.
37. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 16, at 8; see also David I. Walker, Reconsidering Realization-
Based Accounting for Equity Compensation, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 535 (2016).
38. The weakness of a deduction loss was usually framed in opposition to the social and eco-
nomic forces thought to pressure boards into overpaying CEOs. The full account of this
"managerial power" view is attributed to Bebchuk and Fried. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
note 7, at 49-51.
39. See, e.g., Mullane, supra note 34, at 523-25 ("As an initial matter, satisfying the perfor-
mance-based requirements is not challenging. Treasury regulations provide that a perfor-
mance goal does not need to be 'based upon an increase or positive result under a busi-
ness criterion and could include, for example, maintaining the status quo or limiting
economic losses.' Furthermore, once the threshold requirements have been met, there is
no limit to the amount of performance-based compensation that can be deducted." (foot-
note omitted)).
40. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 272 (criticizing the lack of out-of-the-money
option grants).
41. Cf. Polsky, supra note 13, at 905-07 (explaining this skeptical view of executive retirement
plans); Kelli Alces & Brian Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence
from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 65-81 (2012) (offering
a set of reasons to potentially be skeptical of any pro-efficiency defense of deferred
10 Vol 26:1
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Some critics made even stronger claims, suggesting that 162(m) actually pushed ex-
ecutive pay higher for a handful of reasons.42 First, the legislative imprimatur of $1 mil-
lion's "reasonableness" as a salary may have changed market norms for executives
earning less than $1 million.43 On this view, firms with CEOs making a six-figure salary
might have raised that salary closer to $1 million in response to Congress's implicit
approval of that figure as a benchmark. In fact, some empirical work following soon
after 162(m)'s enactment found that those lower CEO salaries did increase.44 On the
other hand, other studies found little evidence that Section 162(m) had an impact on
salary growth rates,45 finding no significant evidence of differences between firms that
had paid more or less than $1 million before the statute was adopted.46
More importantly for our purposes, others noted that the increase in total com-
pensation for executives was driven by the simultaneous rise in option awards. As
discussed above, traditional stock options qualified for the performance-based-pay ex-
ception to 162(m).47 But critics observed that there were good reasons to think that
options (and, later, performance shares) tended to add more to total compensation
sums than did the salary for which they are substituted.
As two of us have previously written, it is certainly plausible that performance-
based compensation like options tends to raise compensation costs at firms.4s Perfor-
mance-based pay is riskier and therefore executives should require a premium to
compensation plans). But see Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Exec-
utive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1205, 1207-08 (2011) (suggesting
that bank executives' inside debt holdings may be beneficial).
42. See sources cited supra note 16.
43. See, e.g., Scott Schaefer & Rachel M. Hayes, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. FIN.
ECON. 280 (2009) (discussing previous suggestions of the phenomenon and developing a
game-theoretic model for it).
44. See Steven Balsam & David Ryan, Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case of CEOs Hired
After the Imposition of 162(m), 22 J. AcCT., AUDITING & FIN. 599, 617-18 (2007); see generally
David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting
Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 AcCT. REv. 997 (2002).
45. See Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to
Influence CEO Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 138, 166 (2002).
46. See id. They did find higher variation among "affected" firms that did not adopt plans to
qualify pay as performance-based. Id. It is hard to interpret this datum, however, because
plan qualification has no tax effect on the salary payments that are the fluctuating de-
pendent variable. They concluded that "[t]his conclusion is consistent with the views ex-
pressed by many compensation consultants and corporate directors [they] have con-
sulted .... [Their] results suggest that corporate pay may be more insulated from this
type of blunt political pressure than it is from the more direct pressure brought to bear at
the individual firm level by stakeholder groups or through the regulatory process." (cita-
tions omitted)). But see Balsam & Ryan, supra note 44, at 600 (arguing that stickiness of
pay practices for incumbent CEOs at the time of Section 162(m)'s adoption accounts for
the lack of evidence for its effect).
47. See Murphy, Politics, supra note 16, at 328 ("Similarly, a variety of rules implemented in
the early 1990s [including 162(m)] are largely responsible for fueling the subsequent op-
tion explosion"); Murphy & Jensen, supra note 16, at 49 (explaining how 162(m) drove the
option explosion).
48. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 27, at 716-27.
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compensate them for taking on that risk.49 Moreover, stock options, the predominant
form of performance-based compensation in the immediate aftermath of 162(m), were
counted as costless under prevailing accounting rules at the time and in fact required
no cash to be paid by the firm when granted.50 Thus, there may have been less pressure
on boards to hold option costs down as compared to salary which generated an ac-
counting charge and cash flow issues. Finally, performance-based pay arguably weak-
ens any "outrage constraint" otherwise imposed by shareholders that might otherwise
keep pay levels in check, as executives appear to be paid only for new value created.
51
As a result of these factors, a substitution of performance-based pay for salary could
lead to a perverse increase in total compensation to top executives.
As described above, after the enactment of 162(m), overall levels of executive com-
pensation did in fact increase, as did the proportion of pay that was performance-
based. It remained an open question, though, as to whether 162(m) actually caused these
results. 162(m)'s adoption coincided with market and shareholder forces pushing for
higher levels of performance-based pay. Beginning in the early 1990s institutional
shareholders began demanding higher levels of equity in pay packages as a way of
aligning executives' incentives with those of shareholders. Later, the SEC revised dis-
closure rules to require far more transparent information about public company com-
pensation matters. The same time period saw the rise of influential proxy advisory
firms such as ISS and Glass Lewis.52 In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the
Dodd-Frank-Act included a provision-Say-on-Pay-that requires a regular non-
binding shareholder vote on compensation decisions. In the light of all of these cir-
cumstances, we see, for example, ISS adopting incredibly detailed voting guidelines
that emphasize as their foundational principle the maintenance of "appropriate pay-
for-performance alignment."53
Was 162(m) leading this movement toward higher levels of performance-based
pay, responding to it, or neither? A number of studies following the onset of the new
tax rules attempted to get at the answer, albeit without complete success.54 Hall and
Liebman, for instance, found evidence of a "minor substitution of performance-related
pay for salary" after the enactment of the rule.55 Yet it proved impossible to control for
the general trendline during the period toward greater use of options and other
49. Id. at 716.
50. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Per-
ceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2002). Furthermore, SEC disclosure
rules at the time did not require disclosure of the cost of most option grants, only the
amount of options granted.
51. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 27, at 718.
52. For more on the role of ISS and Glass Lewis in general, see Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch &
Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869 (2010).
53. See ISS, UNIrED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
39 (2019), https://perma.cc/ZD4Z-FYPM.
54. See Rose & Wolfram, supra note 45.





II. The Fall of the Performance-Based Pay Exception
At the end of 2017, Congress enacted the wide-ranging bill known popularly as
the TCJA.57 Among many other things, the TCJA repealed the "performance-based"
exception to 162(m)'s limitation on compensation deductions.58 Beginning in the 2018
tax year, public firms would receive no deduction for compensation paid to covered
officers over $1 million, regardless of the form of that compensation. The change was
sudden and, as far as we can tell, unexpected by firms, executives, and their tax coun-
sel. While there had been several prior legislative proposals to eliminate the perfor-
mance-based pay exception, none had gone so far as a committee vote by either the
House Ways & Means or Senate Finance committees.59 The House bill that ultimately
became the TCJA included the repeal and was made public on November 2, 2017. The
Senate bill, which was introduced on November 28, also provided for repeal, but also
included a grandfather transition rule that exempted written binding arrangements
that were in effect on November 2. The Conference Committee bill included the Senate
version and was passed by both Houses on December 20 and signed into law by the
President on December 22.
This "seismic shift"60 provides close to a natural experiment regarding the conse-
quentiality of 162(m) for then-existing executive pay practices. Somewhat complicat-
ing matters is the TCJA grandfather rule. In general, repeal of the performance-based
pay exception became ffective in taxable years beginning after 2017.61 The grandfather
rule applied to compensation which is paid pursuant to a written binding contract that
was in effect on November 2, 2017, and which was not modified in any material respect
on or after such date.62 If the grandfather rule applied, compensation that was perfor-
mance-based could still be deducted in 2018 and subsequent years.
In determining whether the grandfather rule applies, a key issue relates to so-
called negative discretion. Recall that a bonus plan that allows for the board to use
discretion to reduce (but not increase) a formulaically derived bonus amount would
qualify as performance-based under pre-TCJA section 162(m). But does the existence
of this negative discretion preclude the grandfather rule because the exercise (or not)
of negative discretion is not part of a written binding contract in effect on November
2,2017? In the government's view, it depends. If the board, under applicable state law,
could reduce the bonus down to zero, then the grandfather rule would not apply to
56. See id. at 24.
57. Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
58. Id. § 13601 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m)).
59. See Doran, supra note 13, at 844.
60. See David M. Kaplan, Tax Reform Bill Tightens $1M Limit on Deductibility of Public Company
Executive Compensation, TROUTMAN PEPPER (Dec. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/5QQP-
Y6NH (describing the repeal as "a seismic shift").
61. TCJA § 13601(e) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m)).
62. Id.
Winter 2021 13
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
any portion of the bonus.6 But if applicable state law permitted only a partial reduc-
tion, then part of the bonus that could not be reduced would qualify for the grandfa-
ther rule.
Making matters more complicated, the government has acknowledged that the
result under state law might not be driven exclusively by the explicit language in the
plan. The preamble to proposed regulations on the topic explained:
Treasury Department and the IRS are aware, however, that compen-
sation arrangements may purport to provide the corporation with a
wider scope of negative discretion than applicable law permits the
corporation to exercise. In that case, the negative discretion is taken
into account only to the extent the corporation may exercise negative
discretion under applicable law.M
In other words, a plan that, pursuant to its explicit terms, would allow the board to
reduce a bonus to zero would still qualify for the grandfather rule to the extent the
corporation could establish that prior custom and practice actually precluded a reduc-
tion of the bonus under applicable state law.
Accordingly, the application of the grandfathering rule to an executive compen-
sation arrangement depends on the particular facts and circumstances. If a bonus plan
includes negative discretion (as is fairly common), some or all of the bonuses ulti-
mately paid may be ineligible for the grandfather rule. Likewise, if an executive em-
ployment contract does not specify a particular number of equity awards to be granted
each year or if it provides compensation committees or boards with negative discretion
to reduce performance share awards or equity grants, the grandfather rule may not
apply. For example, if a CEO employment contract provides for an annual grant of
stock options subject to approval by the compensation committee, that approval re-
quirement (if it would be upheld under state law) would negate the grandfathering
possibility under the TCJA.
Grandfathering obviously poses a problem for analyzing the effect of 162(m)'s re-
peal since it biases post-TCJA pay arrangements toward the status quo ex ante. We
would expect some firms to maintain existing pay arrangements not because 162(m)'s
performance-based pay preference was not important, but rather because it was.
In fact, however, this is merely the tip of the stickiness iceberg. Even without
grandfathering to confound matters, executive employment contracts generally have
terms well beyond one or two years. Thus, many firms and executives were caught
mid-contract by the change in tax law. While technically nothing would prevent the
parties from renegotiating the contract, practical realities (including the potential for
grandfathering) could often make midstream renegotiation unlikely. Therefore, it is
possible that empirical analysis will show few if any immediate effects of the tax law
change because of contracting lags. That is, the change to 162(m) might eventually be
63. See Certain Employee Remuneration in Excess of $1,000,000 Under Internal Revenue
Code Section 162(m), 84 Fed. Reg. 70356, 70365 (proposed Dec. 20, 2019) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (explaining that "applicable law (such as state contract law) determines
the amount of compensation that a corporation is obligated to pay pursuant to a written




consequential but that fact might only become apparent over time as existing contracts
expire.65
Despite these stickiness problems, two sets of researchers have previously at-
tempted to measure the effect of 162(m)'s repeal in the two years since the TCJA, with
differing results. De Simone, McClure, and Stomberg exploited an accounting quirk in
the new rule to construct a difference-in-differences model.66 The elimination of the
performance-based pay exception was generally effective for tax years beginning after
2017 (subject to the grandfather rule).67 Because firms may have different fiscal years,
during the first part of 2018 the new tax rule was generally applicable to firms whose
fiscal year began early in the year, but not to those firms whose fiscal year began later.
De Simone, et al. identified early fiscal-year-start firms as the treatment group and late
fiscal-year-start firms as the control group and compared pay arrangements within the
group over the pre- and post-TCJA periods.68 Obviously, this strategy was only avail-
able for the early part of 2018 and cannot be replicated for later periods.
De Simone et al. find no differences between compensation trends at treatment
and control group firms.69 Specifically, they find no relative changes in total CEO com-
pensation, salary, performance-based pay, or pay-performance sensitivity.70 These re-
sults are consistent with the hypothesis that, at least as of 2017-2018, firms' pay deci-
sions were mainly driven by considerations other than tax.7n However the results may
65. Obviously, the TCJA did a lot more than merely amend section 162(m); these other re-
forms could possibly influence executive compensation design. Most dramatically, the
TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent. TCJA § 13001 (2017).
This change correspondingly reduces the stakes of section 162(m). Before the TCJA, a dis-
allowed deduction would cost a tax-paying corporation 35 cents on the dollar. Now, a
disallowed deduction only costs 21 cents on the dollar. However, because the new section
162(m) eliminated the old provision's loopholes, the lowering of the stakes should be in-
significant. If the loopholes had persisted, perhaps the lowering of the stakes would cause
companies to not go to the trouble of exploiting them? But under new section 162(m), the
loopholes are gone and, therefore, the provision should be factored out of compensation
design decisions regardless of the corporate tax rate.
66. De Simone et al., supra note 21. The difference-in-differences method is a workhorse of
modern econometrics. JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PisCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS xi (2009). The premise is that there are two groups of similar people or
organizations. Id. at 227-31. One of these groups, the "treatment" group, is subject to some
new policy, while the other, the "control," is not. Id. These groups don't need to be iden-
tical before the "treatment" happens, but they should be similar enough that we can ex-
pect that, if not for the treatment, they would each have continued along on the path they
were on before. Id. at 231-33. We can then compare the two groups after the treatment -
the "difference" - and see whether the gaps between them have gotten larger or smaller -
the "differences." Id. By assumption, any change in the paths the two groups are follow-
ing is caused by the treatment. Id. To further strengthen this assumption, researchers can
control for other observable features of the two groups, so that if these features are also
changing around the same time as treatment, we can account for any change in the re-
spective paths that are caused by the controls. Id. at 236-37.
67. De Simone et al., supra note 21, at 3.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 22-27.
71. Id. at 24 (" [O]ur model may not be descriptive of optimal contracting for the average firm
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also indicate that existing executive employment arrangements were sticky during the
relevant six months for treated firms. De Simone et al. locate the potential for this stick-
iness in the potential for grandfathering that may have caused firms to resist making
changes quickly.72 But, as discussed above, the nature of multi-year CEO contracts
themselves may cause firms to be slow to adapt to a change in law as well. Whatever
the cause of stickiness, its potential complicates their finding of no change post-TCJA.73
Luna, Schuchard, and Stanley also studied the effect of 162(m)'s repeal in the im-
mediate aftermath of the TCJA.74 They also use a differences-in-differences analysis by
identifying certain firms as "tax-sensitive."75 "Tax-sensitive" firms, on their account,
are those that paid their CEOs more than $1 million in total compensation but less than
$1 million in what they describe as non-performance-based pay.76 That is, "tax-sensi-
tive" firms are those that seem to have been taking advantage of the tax preference
previously provided by 162(m)? This treatment group is compared with a control
group consisting of firms that paid their CEOs more than $1 million in what they code
as non-performance-based pay,78 and were therefore apparently not responding to the
162(m) incentive (at least fully). When Luna et al. measure for changes post-TCJA, they
find greater salary increases at tax-sensitive firms.79 Similarly, when they observe sal-
ary share of total compensation as the dependent variable, they find marginally sig-
nificant effects in the post-TCJA period, with increases in the share at "tax-sensitive"
firms.80 They note the potential stickiness of CEO contracts,81 but, given their findings
of actual post-TCJA change, do not dwell on it.
In addition to repeal of the performance-based pay exception, the TCJA included
another interesting feature that allows us to further test the tax law's consequentiality.
The TCJA eliminated one relatively easy avoidance strategy -using deferred compen-
sation to avoid the cap. Prior to the TCJA, section 162(m) applied only to compensation
in our sample -perhaps because firm-level tax costs are not a sufficiently important con-
sideration for firms when designing CEO compensation packages. In other words, it is
possible that the pre-TCJA tax benefits of performance-based stock compensation were
not a primary determinant of their usage.").
72. Id. (" [T]he lack of immediate response following the TCJA is consistent with boards hop-
ing that existing pre-TCJA contracts would be grandfathered under the old deductibility
rules, and thus not wanting to disqualify existing contracts by altering them.")
73. De Simone et al. offer an additional analysis of health care firms who experienced a repeal
of 162(m) at an earlier date and find no evidence of different compensation trends at such
firms relative to other firms. See De Simone et al, supra note 21, at 25. Unfortunately, their
sample only includes 17 firms and can therefore only be partially instructive.
74. See Luna et al., supra note 21.




79. Id. at 20.
80. Id. This result disappears, however, when they attempt to deal with potential identifica-
tion bias by using propensity score matching. Id. at 26. In that specification, the effect on
salary remains, however. Id.
81. Id. at 27.
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paid to the then-existing CEO and other four covered employees, as determined on a
year-by-year basis in the year that compensation is paid. Payments to a retired em-
ployee would therefore never be subject to the cap. Accordingly, deferred compensa-
tion arrangements could be used to circumvent old 162(m). One such arrangement is
known as "elective deferrals," which allow an executive to choose to defer a portion
of her future salary.
For example, a CEO with a salary of $1,100,000 might elect to defer $100,000 of her
salary. If so, the $100,000 (plus an investment return) would be paid to the CEO after
she retires. Under old 162(m), none of the company's $1,100,000 salary deduction
would be denied. The first $1,000,000 does not exceed the cap, and the $100,000 of de-
ferred compensation will be paid out after retirement, when the CEO's covered-em-
ployee status ceases.
The TCJA negated this strategy. Under new 162(m), in general, once a covered
employee, always a covered employee.82 Therefore, in the example above, the $100,000
of deferred compensation will be subject to the cap in the year in which it is paid be-
cause the retired executive was a covered employee.u
Where executives are expected to earn more than $1,000,000 in each post-retire-
ment year in which they receive retirement payments, this change could discourage
elective deferrals because the company's deductions will inevitably be denied, regard-
less of any elective deferrals; prior to the TCJA, elective deferrals would have pre-
served deductions. On the other hand, in the context of more modestly paid retired
executives, deferred compensation may still be attractive. In the example above, if the
$100,000 of deferred compensation is paid in a year where the executive earns $900,000
or less of total compensation from the company, it will be deductible because the $1
million cap is not exceeded. This spreading of pay over multiple tax years may even
be more attractive after the repeal of the performance-based pay exception because it
is now the only avoidance strategy left to play.
Although it is not our main purpose here to critique the earlier researchers, they
were not lawyers and did not appear to fully account for all of the relevant technical
issues. When Luna et al. calculate how much firms are paying, they include all of the
organization's reported salary for each executive. But these reported salary figures
represent compensation earned by the executive in that year, not compensation paid in
that year. Section 162(m) generally applies to compensation when it is paid. If any por-
tion of salary was deferred, the reported figure will overestimate the amount of pay
subject to 162(m). Thus, Luna et al. mismeasure both total compensation and also sal-
ary, the most important component of non-performance-based compensation.
82. The permanent covered employee status only applies to individuals who were covered
employees in tax years beginning in 2017 or later. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(3)(C) (2017).
83. The TCJA also designated every CFO a "covered employee" subject to the deductibility
limitation. Arguably, this provides a convenient treatment group as well. However, in-
ternal informal restraints may have shaped CFO compensation by reference to CEO com-
pensation and compensation of other top executives. Therefore, it is unclear whether pre-
TCJA CFO compensation was completely free from the influence of 162(m)'s perfor-
mance-based pay exception.
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III. Empirical Analysis
A. The Basic Set-Up
We revisit the investigation of 162(m) with some methodological wrinkles that we
think overcome some of the challenges faced by earlier researchers. Our aim is to eval-
uate how important 162(m)'s tax incentives were for CEO compensation practices dur-
ing the period around the time of the TCJA's enactment. Specifically, we look to see
whether firms shifted their pay to be less performance-based once there was no longer
any tax advantage for performance-based pay. We also examine whether pay de-
creased based on the hypothesized correlation, described in Part II, between perfor-
mance-based pay and higher overall pay levels.84 Relatedly, we look to see whether
firms and executives altered their deferred compensation practices because after the
TCJA covered employees are now covered forever, whereas prior to the TCJA covered
status was determined on an annual basis.
Like prior researchers, we employ standard difference-in-differences techniques
to estimate the effect of TCJA's changes. This means that we are comparing two similar
groups, one subject o TCJA and the other not, and observing whether TCJA is corre-
lated with differences in outcomes. Furthermore, within these two groups we identify
a pair of key sub-groups, one of which (firms that paid no federal income tax) that we
expect to be relatively indifferent to TCJA's changes to their tax rules, and the other
(firms that paid tax) that would care more. We expect the impact of TCJA, if any, to be
most noticeable in the tax-sensitive firms.
The repeal of the performance-based pay exclusion generally affected firm taxable
years beginning in 2018, so any treatment group would necessarily be comprised of
firms who have filed proxy statements in 2019 and 2020. This creates obvious prob-
lems. First, for 2020, as of this writing we only have data from firms that reported in
the first half of the year. Second, as previously discussed, executive compensation ar-
rangements will often be susceptible to stickiness because of contracting realities or
the TCJA 162(m) grandfather rule. For these reasons, any attempt to study the effect of
the changes to 162(m) may tend to underestimate the ultimate effect of TCJA's
changes.
We respond to the problem of stickiness by restricting our treatment group to new
CEOs who entered into contracts during the two-year post-TCJA period. Because these
executives were entering into new arrangements, the parties were not explicitly con-
strained by existing contracts and the grandfather rule would be inapplicable.85 To ob-
tain a close comparison group of similarly situated executives, we compare this treated
group to the set of newly-hired CEOs in the years just before TCJA, ranging from 2011
to 2017.86 We selected the six-year pre-period as a compromise between two
84. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
85. See Certain Employee Remuneration in Excess of $1,000,000 Under Internal Revenue
Code Section 162(m), 84 Fed. Reg. at 70365.
86. With this method, our results are assuming that any differences we observe between the
two groups are caused either by TCJA or by other factors we can measure and include in
our regression analysis. For example, if we are worried that firms might be more
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considerations. On the one hand, the design of CEO contracts has changed over the
last decade, so that hires from a long time before TCJA may not be a good comparison
group. We balance this against he enhanced ability to cleanly identify year effects and
other controls that results from a larger set of observations.
It nevertheless remains possible that CEO pay changed around the time of the
TCJA for entirely independent reasons for which we cannot control. Even if we were
to find no change to practices, new 162(m) may simply be counterbalancing an omitted
variable - say increased shareholder pressure for performance-based pay - and we
would be unable to confidently interpret a finding of no change as meaning that old
162(m) was inconsequential. For instance, one obvious candidate for an omitted vari-
able is the simultaneous dramatic reduction in the corporate tax rate. If firms did not
respond to the change in deductibility, that may have been driven in part by the re-
duced consequences of the deduction's loss.
Second, in using CEOs hired prior to TCJA as a control, we assume that anticipa-
tion of the 162(m) amendments did not affect their contracts. On this score, we have
something of an advantage in that the repeal of the "performance-based" exception to
162(m) was apparently a surprise to all in late 2017. Therefore, we have a more plausi-
ble treatment group than one might have in normal instances of legal change. Never-
theless, it is possible that information about the change in law leaked earlier during
the second half of 2017. Still, we obtain essentially the same results when we omit ob-
servations from the time very close to enactment, which makes us more confident this
timing issue is not driving our outcomes.
Another distinguishing feature of our approach is to use the employer firm's tax
status to divide our sample into "treated" and "control" firms. We define firms with
zero reported annual federal taxes paid as the "control" firms, which we call "tax-in-
sensitive" (a different use of the term from the one used by Luna et al.). Usually, of
course, employers can claim a deduction for paying their executives, and 162(m)iop-
erates by denying this deduction to some firms. But organizations that already owe
zero taxes for a given year do not immediately benefit from additional deductions (and
may in fact never benefit from them). Thus, at these firms in these years, we should
expect 162(m) to have a smaller impact.87
We follow De Simone et al. in including a set of firm controls that are standard in
the compensation literature (sales, return on assets, return on equity, standard devia-
tion of 5-yr return on assets, standard deviation of 5-yr return on equity, and 5-year
profitable after TCJA, we can see that in their public reporting and account for ("control"
for) that difference. Likewise, we can account for factors that are not directly observable
but are correlated with the year in which they happened - say, any impacts of presidential
election-simply by controlling for the year in which a set of observations occurred. We
call these "year effects." See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 66, at 223.
87. That is not to say that 162(m) would necessarily have zero impact at zero-tax firms. A
firm's unused deductions can be held for claiming in later years, among other uses. I.R.C.
§ 172(a). However, these "carried over" losses are less valuable for a variety of reasons,
including the simple time value of money. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS
STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 129, 199 (5th ed. 2016). Prior researchers find that many
firms in a zero-tax position essentially ignore the possible value of carried-over losses. We
discuss these issues in more detail in Appendix B.
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mean market/book ratio) including indicators for the firm's industry (two-digit SIC).
We also include executive age, which we think is standard but is not reported in De
Simone et al. In some estimates, we include additional controls to attempt to further
rule out rival explanations for some of our results. In particular, like Luna et al., we
include a control for whether a firm is a multi-national entity, based on whether it
reports any pre-tax foreign income or foreign currency income. To distinguish newer
firms or other firms with substantial growth opportunities, we include firm age, his-
toric 5-year ratio of R&D to sales, and historic 5-year sales growth (we already include
market/book ratio, a standard growth measure, in our baseline estimates). To test the
possibility that executives may avoid some forms of deferred compensation because
of firm credit risk, in some estimates we include our measure of the firm's average
credit rating.ss
Finally, to account for the possibility that some initial CEO contracts are of differ-
ing lengths in the first year we observe them, when we observe a partial year, we con-
trol for the number of days of the fiscal year in which the CEO was employed, as well
as the number of days squared. We obtain similar results when we just omit first-year
contracts.
In sum, our basic set-up is to compare the impact of TCJA at treated (relatively
tax-sensitive) firms against control (relatively tax-insensitive) firms. Additional tech-
nical details regarding our data and approach are set forth in Appendices A and B.
B. Descriptive Statistics
To provide an initial overview of the data, Table One presents summary statistics
on our key variables. We divide the table into panels for tax-paying firms (i.e., those
reporting non-zero federal taxes paid) and non-tax payers.
88. Many of these variables regularly take both positive and negative values. Since many,
especially firm-level variables, are highly skewed, our strong preference is to estimate in
logs. We therefore employ the inverse hyperbolic sine (arcsinh) of all our non-indicator
variables. It is true that arcsinh is not concave for negative numbers, Martin Ravallion, A
Concave Log-Like Transformation Allowing Non-Positive Values, 161 EcoN. LETrERS 130, 131
(2017), but this is not an interpretive issue for any of our data. The inverse hyperbolic sine
is an exponential function and so, at least for values not close to zero, interpretation is




Table One: Summary Statistics by Tax-Paying Status
No-Tax Firms Tax Paving Firms
Mean SD Mean SD
Exec Variables
Total Compensation 5938.69 6154.17 7685.75 8389.80
Salary 831.73 398.87 937.62 494.09
Performance Pay (DS) 4524.46 5365.30 6022.56 7417.03
Performance Pay (GLP) 3352.19 4151.00 4686.60 5948.60
Salary Share 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.18
Performance (GLP) Share 0.64 0.26 0.70 0.22
Voluntarily Deferred Comp 91.19 588.15 200.49 1173.51
Exec Age 56.11 7.21 56.55 7.23
Combined LTCG Rate 25.20 5.34 25.23 5.22
State Ordinary Rate 5.99 4.43 5.91 4.02
Combined Ordinary Rate 42.51 3.83 42.47 3.65
Firm Variables
Sales 5513.42 16783.42 10046.72 30329.14
Return on Assets 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.11
Return on Equity 0.36 19.84 0.15 3.50
5-Yr SD of Return on Assets 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05
5-Yr SD of Return on Equity 1.35 14.41 0.48 6.06
5-yr Book:Market Mean 0.87 0.69 0.58 0.44
R&D: Sales Ratio 0.27 4.68 0.03 0.08
5-yr Change in Sales Ratio 3.73 118.13 0.53 3.05
Multi-National Firm? 0.61 0.49 0.68 0.47
Firm Age 26.33 21.06 29.19 22.58
Notes: Observations: 6,487. Covers calendar years 2011-2020. Executive dollar values in thou-
sands of 2019 dollars. Firm dollars in millions of 2019 dollars. Performance Pay (DS) refers to
the measure of performance pay computed by De Simone et al. "GLP" indicates the variation
on performance pay calculated by Galle, Lund, and Polsky. "LTCG" is the long-term capital
gains rate.
The mean total compensation over the period we observe is about $5.94 million
for tax-indifferent firms and $7.69 million for tax payers. The tenth percentile of total
pay is $1.1 million, which is to say that the revised 162(m) would be relevant to more
than 90% of the firm-years we observe. In about four-fifths of sample years firms paid
non-incentive-based compensation in excess of $1 million, suggesting that the old
162(m) offered tax incentives to most firms in the sample. Depending on its exact com-
ponents, performance pay is three to four times larger than salary, on average, with
between 56 and 78% of total compensation performance based. Tax-paying firms are
considerably larger than tax-indifferent firms, as the former have average sales of $10
billion while sales for the latter averaged only $5.5 billion. Both sets of firms are quite
profitable on average, yielding annual profits of between 7 and 17% on assets. Zero-
tax firms are much more R&D intensive.
Notably, tax-paying firms appear to use more performance pay, which would be
consistent with the theory that 162(m) affects compensation. But the fact that these
firms are also different on other dimensions helps to motivate our use of multivariate
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regression, so that we can explore whether the difference in performance pay is driven
by taxes or instead by these other differences. Likewise, we see that executives defer
nearly twice as much salary at tax-paying firms. We'll explore whether this relation-
ship is causal shortly.
For another way of slicing the descriptive data, Table Two reports these same
summary statistics, but this time divided in time. We present mean values for firms in
the years between 2011 and 2017, and for the data we have afterwards. Our dividing
line is based on the date the firm's CEO was hired; firms whose CEO in a given firm-
year was hired before TCJA appear in the column "Pre-TCJA." Obviously, the way
that time works is that only firm years after 2017 can be included in the "Post-TCJA
Hire" column, whereas the "Pre-TCJA Hire" column includes years both before and
after 2017. However, since our sample covers only the first two years of a CEO's tenure,
there are no Pre-TCJA hires in our data from 2019 or 2020.
Table Two: Summary Statistics by CEO Hire Date
Pre-TCJA Hire Post-TCJA Hire
Mean SD Mean SD
Exec Variables
Total Compensation 7028.08 7687.78 7382.95 5230.22
Salary 909.35 467.34 841.09 298.42
Performance Pay (DS) 5409.28 6757.37 6230.43 5160.61
Performance Pay (GLP) 4161.93 5389.44 4111.00 3260.80
Salary Share 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.20
Performance (GLP) Share 0.67 0.23 0.74 0.22
Voluntarily Deferred Comp 172.12 1102.56 65.76 126.54
Exec Age 56.66 7.25 52.92 7.23
Combined LTCG Rate 25.16 5.23 26.61 5.49
State Ordinary Rate 5.87 4.11 4.94 4.36
Combined Ordinary Rate 42.44 3.68 42.44 4.19
Firm Variables
Sales 8413.99 26375.98 8401.71 12020.34
Return on Assets 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16
Return on Equity 0.19 9.65 0.05 0.53
5-Yr SD of Return on Assets 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08
5-Yr SD of Return on Equity 0.68 8.61 0.16 0.31
5-yr Book:Market Mean 0.69 0.54 0.67 0.51
R&D: Sales Ratio 0.24 7.45 0.03 0.06
5-yr Change in Sales Ratio 1.23 55.47 0.27 0.63
Multi-National Firm? 0.61 0.49 0.50 0.50
Firm Age 27.90 22.05 24.87 19.27
Notes: Observations: 6,487. Covers calendar years 2011-2020. Executive dollar values in thou-
sands of 2019 dollars. Firm dollars in millions of 2019 dollars. "Pre-TCJA Hire" indicates that,
for a given firm-year, serving CEO was hired before effective date of TCJA.
In this table, we observe that for CEOs hired after TCJA, the fraction of pay deliv-
ered in salary seems to be about three percentage-points lower after TCJA, a 12.5%
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decline, while performance share increases. Voluntarily deferred compensation falls
by almost two-thirds. Again, though, we can also observe some important differences
in firms, as firm-years with post-TCJA hires see lower R&D and a smaller return on
equity.
We can also see how the differences between tax-paying and tax-indifferent firms
evolved over time. Figures One and Two plot these patterns for some key outcomes of
interest in our analysis: total compensation, performance pay, salary, and the share of
compensation paid as salary. In these graphs, we are depicting the averages among
executives in the first two years of their contract in the respective years. To make in-
terpretation easier, averages for 2018 and 2019 omit executives whose contract was
signed before TCJA. Thus, the means for the post-TCJA years include only contracts
reflecting TCJA changes.
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FIGURE Two: SALARY (TOP) AND SALARY SHARE
On the whole, the figures seem inconsistent with the hypothesis that TCJA im-
portantly affected compensation practices. At firms where tax planning was most im-
portant, we see that contracts after TCJA moved in the opposite directions from what
tax planning would suggest: salary, total compensation, and performance pay were all
up. The share of compensation paid as salary declined slightly at both kinds of firms,
but well in line with pre-TCJA trends.
C. Regression Results: Salary Changes, Salary Share, and Total Compensation
Let's now examine to what extent TCJA seems to have actually caused any of these
differences. Again, our focus is on whether repealing the preference for performance
pay affected the components of executive compensation. As in De Simone et al., we
look at the raw amounts (adjusted, of course, for inflation) of salary and performance
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pay (including and excluding bonuses), and then at the portion of the executive's pay
in the form of salary and performance pay. For comparison purposes, we include esti-
mates both for the De Simone et al. definition of performance pay as well as an alter-
native version in which we exclude time-vested stock.8 9
Table Three summarizes these results. For ease of reading, we suppress reporting
of the control variables, but these are available to interested readers. In these regres-
sions, the key variable of interest is the interaction term, Post-TCJA Hire x Tax-Payer.
This represents the relative impact of the TCJA on CEOs at firms that are the most
sensitive to tax considerations.
Table Three: Effect of 162(m) on Components of Executive Comp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Salary Amount of Amount of Salary Perf. Share
Amount Perf. Pay Perf. Pay Share (DS defn)
(DS def'n) (GLP
Defn)
Hired After TCJA? 0.0164 -0.315 0.148 0.0824* -0.0549
(0.0945) (0.271) (0.300) (0.0445) (0.0402)
Tax-Payer Firm 0.0241 0.109* 0.168** -0.00298 0.00566
(0.0291) (0.0646) (0.0692) (0.00536) (0.00638)
Post-TCJA Hire x Tax-Paver 0.0614 0.200 -0.244 -0.0630 0.0305
(0.104) (0.357) (0.399) (0.0505) (0.0468)
Observations 6,166 6.166 5,291 6,157 6,157
R-squared 0.145 0.242 0.261 0.255 0.175
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in (parenthesis). **:statistically significant at the 5%
level. *:statistically significant at the 10% level. All Cols. use the inverse hyperbolic sine of all
non-indicator variables. All columns include controls for multi-national status, year and two-
digit SIC fixed effects, executive's age, as well as firm sales, return on assets, return on equity,
age, standard deviation of firm's five-year return on assets and equity, and five-year mean
book:market ratio, the firm's R&D:sales ratio and its ratio of five-year change in sales, and
combined LTCG rate, state ordinary rate, and combined state-federal rate in the headquarters
state.
We mostly find no significant results. There is some suggestion in our alternative
performance pay measure (Table Three, Col. Three) that performance pay was higher
for tax-paying firms before TCJA, with the coefficient on the Tax-Payer Firm variable
positive and significant. But we see (in untabulated results) no similar effect for per-
formance share under that definition. Instead, the 95% confidence interval of the coef-
ficient on pre-TCJA taxpayer status runs from -.01 to .017, which is consistent with
either very small increases or decreases. If 162(m) or TCJA affected firms' incentives to
use greater salary relative to performance-based pay, those effects are not evident in
our data.
Although we are unaware of any reason to think that hiring firms expected the
162(m) change, it is possible that unbeknownst to us firms somehow anticipated the
89. As we explain in Appendix A, time-vested stock does not count as performance-based
but for data availability reasons seems to have been treated as such by De Simone et al.
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loss of deductibility for performance-based compensation and adjusted 2017 contracts
for new CEO hires. Therefore, as a robustness check, we use new CEOs hired in 2015
and 2016 (but not 2017) as the control group. In untabulated results, we continue to
find no significant coefficients for post-TCJA hires across any of our specifications.
We next consider evidence on whether 162(m) had any impact on total CEO pay.
Recall that when CEOs receive incentive-based pay, theory suggests that they should
be paid more in total, since they must be compensated for taking on additional risk. 0
Thus, if firms were sensitive to 162(m)'s deductibility limitations and reduced perfor-
mance-based pay after TCJA, they should have been able to pay less overall. Table
Four reports our investigation of that possibility.
Table Four: Effect of 162(m) on Total Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Baseline w/ Exec v/ Exec Levels w/ Poisson w/
Tax Tax & Exec Tax & Exec Tax
Controls Added Added Firmn & Added
Firm Controls Firm
Controls Controls
Hired After TCJA? -0.352* -0.354* -0.366* 0.0630 -0.0377*
(0.197) (0.194) (0.198) (0.266) (0.0221)
Tax-Payer Firm -0.0143 -0.0136 -0.0153 0.0915*** -0.00145
(0.0265) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0330) (0.00299)
Post-TCJA Hire x Tax-Payer 0.362 0.390* 0.384* 0.190 0.0400
(0.222) (0.219) (0.223) (0.293) (0.0247)
DS et al. Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Add'l Finn Controls N N Y Y Y
Observations 6,487 6,441 6,166 6,166 6,166
R-squared 0.378 0.377 0.395 0.161
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in (parenthesis). ***:statistically significant at the 1%
level. *:statistically significant at the 10% level. For Cols. 1-3, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine
of all non-indicator variables. For Col. 5, independent variables are logged. All columns in-
clude controls for multi-national status, year and two-digit SIC fixed effects, executive's age, as
well as firm sales, return on assets, return on equity, age, standard deviation of firm's five-year
return on assets and equity, and five-year mean book:market ratio. "Exec tax controls" are
combined LTCG rate, state ordinary rate, and combined state-federal rate in the headquarters
state. "Added firm controls" are the firm's R&D:sales ratio and its ratio of five-year change in
sales.
Instead, we confirm De Simone et al.'s finding that, although coefficients are neg-
ative, there is no measurable effect of hires after TCJA enactment on total compensa-
tion at traditional (i.e., 5% or less) levels of statistical significance. Likewise, we see no
significant differences between tax-paying and non-tax-paying firms before TCJA. If
anything, as in Figure One, there is modest evidence that pay levels are higher after
TCJA for tax-sensitive firms. Confidence intervals are sufficiently wide that we cannot
rule out large increases for these firms, and our point estimates are all positive and
relatively large in economic terms. Even if pay levels were lower for some firms after
90. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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TCJA, the fact that pay was higher at firms where taxes matter most suggests it was
not the TCJA itself that caused such a change.
These findings are persistent across a wide variety of different specifications, as
summarized in Table Four. For example, we use several different mathematical ap-
proaches to calculate regression results and include some estimates in which we omit
local individual tax rates or measures of firm growth opportunities.91 None of these
appreciably affect the null result.92
Our findings suggest that tax considerations revolving around 162(m) were not
playing particularly consequential roles for major compensation decisions as of the
2016-2019 period. One potential explanation for this is that other non-tax forces de-
scribed above93 were independently driving compensation choices so that the removal
of tax incentives with the TCJA did not change the decision makers' calculus.
D. Gaming the Cap
Next, we test the theory that deferred compensation was used prior to TCJA to
evade the 162(m) cap and, if so, whether the TCJA changed this behavior. As dis-
cussed, nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, such as elective salary de-
ferrals, could be used under old 162(m) to avoid the cap by pushing compensation
deductions into years in which the executive was retired and therefore was no longer
a covered employee.94 Congress presumably had these practices in mind when TCJA
expanded the definition of covered employee to include any individual who had pre-
viously been a covered employee. In other words, after TCJA, once a covered em-
ployee, always a covered employee. This negates the deferred compensation 162(m)
avoidance strategy. Our understanding is that elective salary deferrals were used at
least in part for this purpose.95
Execucomp reports elective salary deferrals as "deferred compensation employee
total" or "DCET." To test whether DCET had been used specifically to end-run the
162(m) limitation, we implement the triple-differences method described in Appendix
A. Briefly, we examine the relative prevalence of DCET among firms that pay more
than $1 million of non-incentive-based compensation. Since after TCJA this threshold
is no longer meaningful, we expect that DCET use among these firms will drop,
91. We describe these and the other control variables in more detail in Appendix A.
92. As a robustness check on whether using the inverse hyperbolic sine technique drives our
result, we re-estimate each specification using poisson regression and the levels (rather
than IHS) of the outcome variable. Point estimates are smaller but no more precise in
poisson. Table Three, Col. Five reports one of these, in which we include all our controls,
but none of the poisson estimates finds anything appreciably different than the log-log
regressions.
93. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Deferred Compensation Unbound 8 (Apr. 28, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (https://perma.cc/HQ78-T4LN) ("It was long understood that deferring
compensation beyond the termination of employment bypassed the section 162(m) de-
duction limit, a point that gave another tax reason for executives to defer receipt of their
pay." (citations omitted)).
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especially among taxpayer firms that might have been especially motivated to use the
technique prior to 2018. Table Five summarizes our results. Again, for ease of reading
we omit reporting of most control variables.
Table Five: Effects of 162(m) on Deferred Cash Compensation
(2) (3) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DCET DCET DCET DCCT
DS All All All
Controls Controls Controls Controls
TCJA x Over 2017 Cap 0.438* 0.384
(0.265) (0.272)
Tax-Payer x Over 2017 Cap 0.377** 0.325**
(0.156) (0.163)
TCJA x Tax-Payer x Over 2017 Cap -0.692** -0.605*
(0.347) (0.355)
TCJA x Tax-Payer x Over 2018 Cap 2.854*** 2.647***
(0.786) (0.759)
Arcsinh Combined LTCG Rate -2.658** -2.147* -2.454* -1.114
(1.234) (1.261) (1.258) (1.098)
Arcsinh State Ordinary Rate 0.382*** 0.374*** 0.363*** 0.415***
(0.0707) (0.0721) (0.0723) (0.0610)
Observations 6,509 6,232 6,166 6,166
R-squared 0.122 0.130 0.131 0.197
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in (parenthesis). ***:statistically significant at the 1%
level. **: statistically significant at the 5% level. All columns employ the inverse hyperbolic
sine of all non-indicator variables. All columns include controls for a full set of partial cross-
interactions, year and two-digit SIC fixed effects, combined ordinary tax rate, and executive's
age, as well as firm sales, return on assets, return on equity, age, standard deviation of firm's
five-year return on assets and equity, and five-year mean book:market ratio. Columns Two-
Four also control for firm's multi-national status, R&D:sales ratio, and ratio of five-year change
in sales. "TCJA" = CEO hired post-TCJA. "Over 2017 Cap" = CEO received more than $1m in
non-incentive compensation. "Over 2018 Cap" = CEO received more than $1m in any compen-
sation.
We find evidence strongly consistent with the use of DCET to avoid 162(m), but
also some suggestive evidence that TCJA did not end the use of DCET for a similar
purpose. As expected, relative to uncapped or non-taxpayer firms, DCET is higher
among capped taxpayer firms (i.e., those paying more than $1 million in non-incentive
comp) prior to TCJA; this is the positive and significant coefficient for the variable Tax-
Payer x Over 2017 Cap in Table Five Col. One. Use of DCET is markedly lower in this
situation after TCJA, as shown by the large negative and significant coefficient for the
variable TCJA x Tax-Payer x Over 2017 Cap in that same column. In other words, if a
firm was paying more than $1 million in non-incentive-based compensation before
TCJA, it was also using DCET, but after TCJA this was largely no longer the case. That
fits our prediction. We obtain similar results, but slightly less precisely estimated,
when we include some additional controls not used in De Simone et al. (Table Five,
Col. Two).
As we noted earlier, DCET can still allow some firms to avoid the new 162(m) $1
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million cap by moving compensation into retirement years in which a covered execu-
tive might earn less than $1 million in compensation. Some firms might have more
than $1 million in total compensation but less than $1 million in non-incentive-based
pay (say, a firm that pays $10 million in performance pay and only $100,000 in salary).
These firms would not have benefited from DCET in 2017 but potentially could in 2018.
To further test this possibility, we run several additional regressions. In each of
these, we include interactions among taxpayer status, TCJA, and whether a CEO re-
ceives more than $1 million in total realized compensation in a year; we emphasize
that this is a different total than the total reported in the SEC-mandated Summary
Compensation Table, but instead is the sum of taxable annual income. In essence, this
is the flip of the tests reported in Table Five Cols. One and Two: $1 million in total
compensation is not a meaningful threshold before 2018, so we expect to see effects for
that term only post-TCJA. We report this analysis in Table Five Col. Three.
We find that DCET is markedly higher post-TCJA among taxpayer firms but only
if the executive has total taxable income of more than $1 million. That is, on average
DCET is two or three times larger among the firms where DCET would most usefully
avoid the new 162(m) limitation.
There is also some evidence that firms use their own contributions to the CEO's
retirement plans for this purpose. These are payments from the firm to the executive
that go directly into her retirement account, with no option for the CEO to obtain im-
mediate cash instead. Often, these are structured as matches of employee voluntary
contributions, so we expect these to look quite similar to DCET. And indeed, when we
run similar regressions (reported in Table Five, Col. Four) in which corporate defined-
contribution-plan contributions are the outcome variable, we again see a large and
positive effect for tax-sensitive firms that pay in excess of $1 million after 2017.
Overall, then, we find strong evidence that organizations exploited the deferred-
compensation loophole in 162(m) prior to TCJA. Congress's supposed fix, however,
did not close the loophole, but instead just moved it over a little.
The disparate effects of the TCJA on major compensation choices (none) and
smaller choices (significant) are consistent with the outsized role of shareholder over-
sight and pressure. As discussed above, shareholder groups and their advisors are
keenly sensitive to matters of pay-for-performance and overall pay.96 Those same play-
ers, however, appear to offer no oversight or guidance with respect to elective defer-
rals. For example, ISS, the most significant proxy advisor, devotes a significant portion
of its U.S. voting guidelines to the alignment of executive pay and firm performance
and peer benchmarking with respect to overall pay.97 It devotes not a word to elective
deferral practices.98 It is not surprising perhaps, then, that firms responded quickly to
tax changes regarding the latter but not the former.99
96. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See Kobi Kastiel & Noam Noked, The 'Hidden' Tax Cost of Executive Compensation, 70 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 179, 184 (May 2018) (predicting that companies will not change compen-
sation practices after TCJA because of the influence of proxy advisor firms).
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Conclusion
For decades, scholars and policy makers have debated the import of tax rules,
particularly the performance-based pay exception to Section 162(m), for the shape of
executive compensation in the U.S. Using a novel empirical design, we find no evi-
dence that the repeal of that exception changed the compensation features commonly
believed to be the most material-the proportion of performance-based pay to total
pay and the levels of total pay. This suggests that, at least in recent years, those pay
decisions were overdetermined by factors beyond tax, e.g., increased transparency,
shareholder pressure, path dependency, etc.
We cannot say with a great deal of confidence whether the performance-based
pay exception to 162(m) was more consequential around its adoption in the mid-1990s,
but our data suggests those who would put the rise in equity pay and overall pay levels
at the feet of tax policy should be cautious in their interpretations. On the other hand,
our evidence suggests that policy makers seeking to influence executive compensation
in the future should be humble when projecting the influence they expect tax laws to
exert over the most important compensation matters. To the extent future lawmakers
wish to constrain compensation, they should be pessimistic about the impact of tax
nudges.
When we move from headline compensation decisions to smaller bore ones, how-
ever, our data show that tax begins to have a more pronounced influence. With respect
to elective deferrals by executives, for instance, small tax policy choices appear to mat-
ter. The distinguishing feature between the two types of compensation decisions - af-
fected or not-seems to be the transparency and salience of those decisions to other
constituencies. This suggests that tax incentives in the executive compensation arena




Appendix A: Research Design
As described in the Article, our basic set-up is to compare the impact of TCJA at
treated (relatively tax-sensitive) firms against control (relatively tax-insensitive) firms.
Equation One summarizes this approach.
Oit= ao + f 1TCJAit + f32TCJAit * Taxpayerit + /33CGit +
&4Combined0rdinaryit+ &4State0rdinaryit + fSXit + 6Wit +
f 7w 2*Partialit + <pt+ Eit (1)
where for a given outcome Oit, TCJAit is the effect of the law change, Taxpayerit
is an indicator for tax-sensitive firms, CGit is our measure of the state-federal LTCG
rate, Ordinaryit is the executive's tax rate on ordinary income, Xit and Wit are vectors
of firm (including two-digit SIC indicator) and executive controls, and w? 2 is our con-
trol for the number of days of the contract year. Pt is a year fixed effect and Fit is the
error term.
In order to test our predictions about the use of certain forms of compensation to
game the computation of the § 162(m) cap, we additionally run some triple-difference
estimates. In these specifications, we are still comparing tax-paying to non-taxpayer
firms across the enactment of TCJA. We then interact with both of these an indicator
for whether a given CEO's compensation would have been at or above the 2017 defi-
nition of the § 162(m) cap. In effect, we test whether firms whose non-incentive-based
pay sums to less than $1 million behave differently before and after TCJA, and allow
this estimate to vary by whether the firm pays federal taxes.
Prior literature has imperfectly measured this threshold. For purposes of 162(m),
"performance-based" pay should not include increments to stock incentive plans
based on non-performance metrics, such as "time-vested" restricted stock that an ex-
ecutive can earn simply by remaining employed. Nor does it include most perquisites
to the extent these would be taxable to the executive, such as free housing or private
use of company aircraft. Thus, when we calculate the amount of compensation an ex-
ecutive receives that counts against the pre-TCJA cap, we include not only salary (as
in De Simone et al. and Luna et al.), but also our estimate of the value of newly vested
restricted stock, as well as "other" compensation from the Summary Compensation
Table.
While we improve on earlier cap measures, ours too is a bit limited by Execucomp
reporting. As we mentioned, the definition of "performance-based" pay excludes sal-
ary, but does not include salary voluntarily deferred by the executive through so-
called "elective deferrals." Execucomp's reported salary figure does not reflect reduc-
tions for elective deferrals, and so we subtract executive deferrals from salary when
using salary as an input into our cap calculations. "Other" compensation reported by
Execucomp may be overinclusive to the extent it includes untaxed fringe benefits such
as health insurance, but we believe these represent a small fraction of the "other" cat-
egory. In theory, Execucomp's "bonus" category may include some payments that also
were not qualified as incentive-based, such as purely discretionary bonuses. But our
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understanding from professionals in the field is that nearly all bonuses of the pre-TCJA
era were designed to allow them to be deductible, e.g., were based on objective perfor-
mance criteria.
Equation Two, thus, summarizes our approach for the triple-difference estimates.
Oit= ao + fi1TCJAit + f32TCJAit * Taxpayerit + W3Cappedit +
34T CJAit*Cappedit + flsTaxpayerit*Cappedit + T36 CIAtt *
Taxpayerit*Cappedit + f 7CGit + f3CombinedOrdinaryit+
/3qStateOrdinarygt+ 1310Xi + fl1 1Wi + f312 wf*Partialit + <pW+ Eit (2)
In this Equation, Cappedit is our indicator for whether reported compensation
would have equaled or exceeded the 2017 cap on non-incentive-based pay. We include




Appendix B: Data Collection
We draw a panel of basic firm and executive data from Compustat, an on-line data
warehouse for public company filings, for the period January 2010 through April of
2020. Because of their unique tax profile, we omit real estate investment trusts. We
identify publicly-traded REITs using listings at REITnotes.com.
One of our key predictive variables is the tax rate facing each firm. As in many
prior papers, we code a firm as having a zero marginal rate when it reports zero federal
taxes paid in a given tax year.100 As an economic matter, the marginal rate that is rele-
vant for planning purposes may well be non-zero for firms with zero current taxes
paid.101
For firm age, we rely on several additional sources. We have direct observations
of firm founding dates from the compilation by Jay Ritter of firms that had their initial
public offering between 1970 and 2019.102 For firms missing from this list, we define
the firm's founding year as the first year it appears in The Center for Research in
100. Some prior research has instead relied on the presence of tax-loss carryforwards (also
known as "NOLs," or net operating losses), which represent unused deductions from
prior and current years. These are highly unreliable measures of the firm's marginal rate.
For one, Compustat reports them inaccurately. Shane Heitzman & Rebecca Lester, Net
Operating Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Financial Policies 1, 17-20 (Nov. 10, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (https://perma.cc/E8FL-6TN5). More problematically, a firm
often reports holding NOLs even though its marginal rate is the full statutory rate.
Among other reasons, many firms are legally limited in their annual use of prior-year
NOLs. E.g., I.R.C. § 382. A large share of NOLs are also from non-U.S. jurisdictions or
from states, Heitzman & Lester, supra, at 42 tbl.1, and thus do not directly impact federal
tax rates.
101. For example, the firm may expect to be taxable at some point during the life of the project
being planned. Also, prior to 2018, firms with excess losses could carry back excess de-
ductions to prior years. SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 87, at 352. In the case of firms with
persistent tax minimization strategies, additional deferred deductions may have very
small present value. See id. at 81 (noting that NOLs are rarely valuable at start-up firms
many years away from profitability). At a minimum, it is the case that all else equal firms
with zero tax paid in a given year have a lower average effective marginal rate over the
life of their projects than firms that are current taxpayers.
In addition, there are good reasons to believe that firms with zero taxes paid behave as
though they had a zero marginal rate. See John R. Graham et al., Incentives for Tax Planning
and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field, 89 AccT. REv. 991 (2014) (finding that fewer than
one firm in six uses its true marginal rate for planning purposes and that many instead
use their average rate as reflected on financial statements, the GAAP effective tax rate);
Lily L. Batchelder, Accounting for Behavioral Considerations in Business Tax Reform: The
Case of Expensing 16-22 (Jan. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(https://perma.cc/Y3JF-RBU8) (noting similar evidence with respect to firm decisions
about capital investments); see also Qiping Xu & Eric Zwick, Tax Policy & Abnormal Invest-
ment Behavior 36 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27363, 2020),
https://perma.cc/UMH6-MVVT (reporting evidence that tax planning is most important
to firms for liquidity reasons, so that in effect firms act as though future benefits are not
very valuable). Firms face relatively little pressure to use better metrics because outside
investors themselves generally use simple heuristics for the firm's marginal rate. Kathleen
Powers et al., Examining Which Tax Rates Investors Use for Equity Valuation 18-21 (Apr.
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (https://perma.cc/9VWL-HQ7V).
102. Jay Ritter, IPO DATA, https:/ /perma.cc/DAU9-M5XX (archived Nov. 8, 2020).
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Security Prices stock-price data. Finally, in the event that Compustat provides data for
an earlier year than either of these sources, we define the firm's first year as that year.
Turning to data on executives, we are obliged to make some approximations to
connect data reported in Execucomp to tax outcomes. In particular, SEC reporting
rules allow firms to report a combined value for two distinct instruments: performance
shares and time-vested restricted stock (i.e., stock that is awarded automatically as
long as the executive stays at the firm long enough). New stock awards promised to
executives are included in the "stock awards_fv" variable, while awards of either kind
that vest during the reporting periods are included in the (confusingly named) "stock
awards" variable. As noted, time-vested restricted stock does not qualify as perfor-
mance-based under old section 162(m). De Simone et al. appear to include all stock-
based awards in their measure of performance pay,10 even though time-vested re-
stricted stock does not qualify. Similarly, Luna et al. elect not to include the value of
time-vested stock that vests during the reporting year for purposes of determining
whether an executive earned $1m or more in incentive-based compensation,m0 even
though these vested shares plainly did count against the $1m cap.
We depart slightly from these earlier efforts by imputing a value for time-vested
stock. Execucomp does separately report the firm-reported value of unvested shares
of each of the categories (i.e., performance shares and time-vested restricted stock).
Thus, in our main reported results we take the proportion of a given firm-year's un-
vested stock that is time-vested and assume that both new and vested awards in that
year occur in this same proportion. We then include only the residual portion in our
definition of "performance based." In computing whether a firm is at the pre-2018
162(m) cap, we include our imputed measure of time-vesting vested stock.
103. De Simone et al., supra note 21, at 11 n.8 ("Performance Pay includes all share awards....").
104. Luna et al., supra note 21, at 15-16.
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